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1. Preliminary Reflections 
The recent call for a conceptual and intellectual 
decolonization in the humanities critiques the conventional, 
all-white, largely male philosophical canon. Its critique is 
directed at the centering of the experiences of this specific 
group in global knowledge transmission practices. Its 
proponents focus on the canon’s implicit claim, namely that 
only one social group is able to think thoroughly and 
accurately about all problems of philosophical significance 
across varying spatiotemporal contexts. In this short article, 
I will use two different debates to make some aspects of this 
call more meaningful: the US-American discourse in 
academic philosophy on deracializing the knowing subject 
and the post-Holocaust German understanding of public 
intellectual spaces (sections 2 and 3 respectively). Notably, 
there is no principle reason to delimit the application of 
these discourses to their respective contexts. In fact, Jim 
Tully’s work, which is briefly sketched in section 3, can 
serve as a conduit between both debates (see Kirloskar-
Steinbach, 2019). 
After the Holocaust, the re-education policies adopted in 
postwar Germany sought to sow the seeds of a democratic 
culture through the creation of what Anna Parkinson terms 
“intimate geographies” (Parkinson, 2017, p. 96). 
Accordingly, one sought to create “intersubjective spaces 
and communicative modalities through which discussion, 
conflict, and behavior [could be] negotiated, and [could] act 
to reproduce, or, at times to alter a society’s habitus or 
social norms and ways of existing in the world” (Parkinson, 
2017, p. 96). These spaces, one could say, explicitly 
encouraged speaking truth to power.  
The involvement of the Frankfurt School’s first-
generation thinkers in these policies is well-documented. 
Despite some internal differences, philosophers like Max 
Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno worked to create a critical 
mass of intellectuals who would resist the lure and power of 
collectives, statist or otherwise. Adorno saw individual 
autonomy as an empowering force, which would enable a 
person to withstand communal pressure (see below). Under 
his influence, intellectuals in postwar Germany hammered 
out a blueprint that perceived the development of 
democratic institutions as a long-term normative project 
(Albrecht, 1999, p. 447). For its implementation, this 
blueprint relied heavily on a stable sense of belonging to a 
society which valued democratic freedoms.  
In Adorno’s analysis, teachers were one group which 
could in principle abet the development of this sense of 
belonging. While they could play a crucial role in 
inculcating this sense, he assumed that this group was not 
sufficiently aware of, or was ignorant about, its own social 
role and the structure of social reality in Germany 
immediately after the war (see Albrecht, 1999, p. 404). 
Adorno placed his hopes in the development of specially 
designed teacher-training courses. If teachers’ critical self-
consciousness were to be trained, they could help to build 
up a new society that consciously moved away from the 
authoritarian mode of being to a democratic one. Education 
was highly significant in this respect: “The only education 
that has any sense at all is an education toward critical self-
reflection” (Adorno, 2003, pp. 21-22). Over time, this 
society would learn to appreciate, and value, democratic 
freedoms, including those of individuals who chose not to 
cooperate. Society would be aware that the bonds of its 
groups could be fatal since they were prone to encourage 
‘group-think.’ Adorno used his own role as a public 
intellectual to underscore the importance of democratic 
institutions for postwar German society.  
The following pages will abstain from developing a 
general theory about conceptual and intellectual 
decolonization in order to foreground this specific German 
situation. Another reason demands this deliberate abstention 
too. One key insight of the debate on conceptual and 
intellectual decolonization is that it behooves us well as 
academics to develop a more skeptical attitude toward our 
academic practices. One such practice is our uninhibited—
and relatively unreflective—use of universal theories. In the 
humanities, we are generally taught to believe that the 
reality we seek to interpret can be adequately grasped 
through universal theories. However, these theories have a 
dark underbelly too, as we have learnt from critical 
accounts.  
Although several universal theories in academic 
philosophy position themselves as harbingers of reason and 
progress, this self-positioning may turn out to be inadequate 
in important ways: Theories purported to have a universal 
reach may be able to capture only selective aspects of what 
is sought to be known. Their attempts to capture reality in 
one fell swoop across differing contexts may conceal those 
aspects which these theories have been unable to capture. 
This inadequacy may be passed over. It may even remain 
undetected, especially when the universal ability of these 
theories to track reality across varied contexts is taken as the 
default assumption. 
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In the light of the specific situation of postwar Germany 
and the aforementioned methodological reason, this article 
places itself along the lines of what Stefan Müller-Doohm 
calls “conscious-raising critique” (Müller-Doohm, 2005, p. 
278).1 Typically, a conscious-raising critique “is not 
objectively better knowledge, it is not formulated from an 
external point of view, but is based on the internal 
perspective of the culture. It takes its departure from the 
internal structures of distorted communication. It diagnoses 
internal conflict and contradictions not against the 
background of factually meaningful norms, but also of 
norms which have been established or have yet to be 
established as meaningful” (Müller-Doohm, 2005, p. 278). 
Against the background of these preliminary remarks, let us 
now turn to our first case: the discourse in US-American 
academic philosophy. 
2. Deracializing the Knowing Subject in US-
American Academic Philosophy  
It should be relatively easy to make a case for conceptual 
and intellectual decolonization using an argument which 
leans on diversity. However, some warn about exploring the 
philosophical merits of this questionable term of managerial 
repute. In their view, diversity is the self-marketing 
perspective of a university, which tries to contain diversity 
through its governance strategies. It is merely a means to 
“make the successful even more successful” (Ahmed, 2012, 
p. 110).  
If one were to heed this warning, however, one would 
most likely miss out on philosophically-exciting literature 
which follows the trail left by philosophers’ bodies on 
scholarship. In her Presidential Address to the American 
Philosophical Association’s Eastern Division in 2012, Linda 
Martín Alcoff called upon her colleagues to reflect upon the 
overrepresentation of white males in academic philosophy 
in the US, or as she put it, to think about why the profession 
was “demographically challenged” (Martín Alcoff, 2013, p. 
21). Martín Alcoff and some of her colleagues worry about 
the crucial implications of this imbalance on the discipline. 
They are concerned that this group’s social and epistemic 
standpoints may be simply reproduced, especially in areas 
in which philosophy is expected to deliver a careful analysis 
of justice and injustice. “[W]hite miscognition,” which 
Charles Mills has documented in the history of social and 
political philosophy, will be continued in this case. Group 
privilege may not be perceived and/or challenged. Given 
that the aforesaid miscognition is a “structural phenomenon 
rather than the result of individual white myopias” (Mills, 
2017, p. xvii), it will impact the manner in which the 
discipline as a whole is practiced.   
Several philosophers in the US home in on the larger 
ramifications of this demographic overrepresentation, and 
imbalance. Some, for example, point out to results of 
empirical studies, which illustrate that homogenous groups, 
like all-male and/or all-white groups, tend to perceive 
themselves as being more effective and are more confident 
about their problem-solving abilities (see Bruya, 2017, p. 
999). Others worry that this imbalance will have long-term 
detrimental consequences for the profession in their 
pluralistic society. They are concerned that a homogenous 
group of philosophers will tend to breed and support 
“epistemic arrogance” (Medina). Purported epistemic 
authorities will speak from standpoints of accrued 
credibility excess. If such a discursive practice is retained 
over time, they reason, it may lead to a “meta-blindness,” “a 
particularly recalcitrant kind of ignorance about the 
cognitive and affective limitations of one’s own 
perspective” (Medina, 2011, p. 29). If such “socially 
cultivated hermeneutical insensitivities” (Medina, 2012, p. 
207) are not reined in, the society as a whole may render 
itself vulnerable to multiple sources of epistemic injustice.  
The profession’s lack of diversity is critiqued from 
another perspective too. This critique sets its sights on the 
subtle “boundary-policing” practices of the profession, 
which continue below the surface till today (Olberding, 
2017, p. 1023). These practices seem to be driven by the 
premise that the cultural production of those hitherto 
excluded from the profession did not allegedly have “the 
potential to carry theoretical production” (Dotson, 2013, p. 
41). Although one may consider such exclusionary views as 
mere historical curiosities today, the structures of 
philosophical knowledge production continue to propagate 
the belief that philosophical knowledge production is an 
activity specific only to the North American and European 
contexts. “Philosophy as a discipline,” writes Michael 
Monahan, “remains white in the sense that it incorporates 
white assumptions, perspectives and traditions even while it 
claims to be universal and beyond such particularities as 
race” (Monahan, 2011, p. 220). 
In their own ways, both lines of critique endeavor to 
bring into relief the embodied nature of philosophical 
inquiry. They push back against the “transcendental 
delusion” (Martín Alcoff) prevalent in the discipline. 
Philosophical inquiry is not carried out by disembodied 
minds, they argue, but by concrete bodies placed in specific, 
spatiotemporal and socio-material contexts. In 
philosophizing, people make a concerted attempt at 
understanding the world around them from their own 
vantage point in space and time. For this purpose, they 
make use of a conceptual vocabulary which has grown out 
of the humus of common customs and life-forms. In other 
words, philosophical concepts have their own provenance 
(see Janz, 1996). They are generated in specific places for 
specific purposes. Philosophical activity, thus, cannot be 
meaningfully separated from the historical and corporeal 
particularity of its epistemic subjects. To be able to 
understand these local processes of meaning making better, 
we must ground philosophical content in different 
traditions. In grounding this content though, we must be 
attuned to the role socio-political factors play in the process.  
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Both these lines of critique can be deployed to make a 
case for conceptual and intellectual decolonization. In 
different ways, both argue for deracializing the extant belief 
about the ideal, representational, knowing subject. If the 
centering of certain bodies in the profession is a mere 
contingent outcome of certain socio-political processes, 
there is no plausible justification to continue this centering 
in a multicultural society, and in an interdependent world. 
In fact, this centering will most likely lead to faulty 
assumptions about our meaning-making endeavors in 
academic philosophy. These assumptions may, for example, 
lead homogenous groups to overestimate the ability of their 
conceptual frameworks to capture reality. The narrowness 
of their inquiry may be detrimental to further the 
development of that inquiry itself, especially when group 
members engage in boundary-policing such that an 
interrogation of the assumptions driving their inquiry is 
made impossible.  
As this section illustrates, the claim that the diversity 
lens cannot be deployed to argue for conceptual and 
intellectual decolonization is unconvincing, at least in the 
context of some current debates in US-American academic 
philosophy. We also see that our willingness not to take this 
claim at face-value has borne fruit. We have encountered 
critical positions which seek to rectify current ways of 
doing academic philosophy. 
Now, having come so far, one may hesitate to engage 
with our second case: academic philosophy in Germany. 
Even our introductory comments suggest that current 
practices there fail to sufficiently track the trail of a 
philosopher’s body on scholarship, be it in teaching, or 
scholarly output. A mere cursory look at this context hints 
at the lack of a significant debate on the adequacy of the 
standard, all-white, largely male philosophical canon for a 
multicultural society and for an independent world, 
although theory produced in German intellectual and 
linguistic spaces has played a seminal role in the making of 
the current philosophical canon. The marginalization of 
postcolonial and decolonial minority scholars within 
philosophical departments is hard to overlook too. So, why 
engage with this specific context at all? Like in our first 
case, let us not give up prematurely. Let us persist. 
3. Communicative Spaces and German Publics 
If one sought to place the aforementioned call for 
decolonization within the context of contemporary 
Germany, we may need to revisit those intersubjective 
spaces and communicative modalities alluded to above. As 
we saw in section 1, educational institutions in post-
Holocaust Germany were tailored to develop, and abet, a 
specific sense of belonging to a democratic polity. This 
belonging defined itself not through pre-given cultural 
determinants but through the making of a new society based 
on democratic freedoms. The communicative spaces 
designed for this purpose were said to be able to withstand 
the searing forces of a robust argumentative exchange, thus 
enabling individuals to use these spaces to challenge the 
force of collectives. By placing this article in this particular 
public discussion forum, I would be doing precisely that. I 
would be using the space created by some German scholars, 
and afforded by this exchange, to shed light on current 
practices in German academic philosophy, which in my 
view distort communication within the German academy 
and beyond. So far, so good.  
But how should one frame the argument such that it can 
easily resonate with frameworks extant within this context? 
One possibility would be, to use Jim Tully’s understanding 
of a “civic philosopher.” Such a philosopher takes her role 
as a civic philosopher seriously; she will allow for a “robust 
degree of democratic participation” (Tully, 2014, p. 319). In 
her commitment to foreground the societal and global 
implications of her academic work, she would be ready to 
(re)engage in the “art of citizenship,” especially when co-
citizens (whether of one’s own society or of the world) 
voice their concern that certain actions have hegemonic and 
authoritarian outcomes for individuals and/or groups. 
The “interlocutionary intervention” (Tully, 2008, p. 17) 
this article intends to present is a case in point. A civic 
philosopher will not strike down the article’s claims with 
the counter-claim that the former has negligible 
philosophical worth because it is neither voiced by the 
majority of professional philosophers in Germany nor does 
it in any way impact German-speaking scholarly literature. 
A civic philosopher is open to the possibility that the 
“inherited languages of description and reflection” may be 
inadequate (Tully, 2008, p. 19). She may, be ready to 
concede – and perhaps in the long-run break up – with the 
“monological orientation” of the discipline. 
Tully’s views promise to be one meaningful contribution 
in our context. Not only has some of his work been 
translated in German. In some aspects, it intersects with 
Adorno’s ruminations sketched above too. Tully’s civic 
philosopher, who keenly engages with voices that contest, 
and perhaps even undermine, conventional opinions, 
reverberates well with Adorno’s understanding of 
democratic freedoms being crucially dependent on critical 
individual inquiry. To thrive, a democracy in Adorno’s 
reasoning depends on the “political, social, and moral 
awareness” of its citizens. One prerequisite hereof must be 
the capacity and courage of each individual to make full use 
of [her] reasoning power” (Adorno, 1999, p. 21). 
Adorno would argue that academic philosophers cannot 
plausibly claim that democratic spaces are removed from 
their scholarly debates. In fact, they should value such 
spaces. They abet critical inquiry, especially when, for 
example, individuals use them to think their way out of 
constricted spaces whose “doors are barricaded” (Adorno, 
2005, p. 291). After all, “thinking has a secure hold on 
possibility. Its insatiable aspect, its aversion to being 
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quickly and easily satisfied, refuses the foolish wisdom of 
resignation” (Adorno, 2005, p. 292). 
4. Conclusion 
 
As partakers of a profession that prides itself in its 
engagement with arguments, even contrary ones, 
philosophers cannot plausibly continue to diligently sidestep 
the call for conceptual and intellectual decolonization. 
Section 2 sketched how the work of some US-philosophers 
lays bare the “wonderful geographical doublespeak in the 
philosophy profession” (Martín Alcoff, 2017, p. 403) 
through which one geographical region papers over the 
contextuality of its own practices while simultaneously 
highlighting this very contextuality of other regions. While 
debates in current German philosophy have yet to 
adequately engage with the trail philosophers’ specific 
bodies leaves on scholarship, the societal context in 
contemporary Germany possesses resources that can be 
meaningfully harnessed for the call (see section 3). 
Indeed, deploying these resources for conceptual and 
intellectual decolonization may impact the use of these 
resources in the future (see Steinmetz, 2006; see Kirloskar-
Steinbach & Mika, 2019). In fact, this specific use may 
have substantial consequences for the philosophical canon 
as we understand it today, and perhaps even for debates in 
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1 For Müller-Doohm, Adorno and his prominent student Jürgen Habermas exemplify such internal critiques in post-
Holocaust German society, albeit in different ways. 
